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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceptions and 
evaluations of crime situations by expert and novice criminals. My 
approach to the issues of expertise in decision making and deterrence 
in the criminal justice system draws upon literature from the areas 
of deterrence, crime perceptions, the evaluation of crime opportuni-
ties, and expertise. Because this study focuses on shoplifting as 
the crime of interest, a brief review of shoplifting research will also 
be presented. 
Deterrence 
Deterrence is defined as "the inhibiting effect of sanctions on 
the criminal activity of people" (Blumstein et al., 1978; p. 3). 
This appears to be the underlying assumption of many methods utilized 
by the legal and criminal justice system in dealing with crime. The 
concept of deterrence is often partitioned into_general deterrence 
and special deterrence. General deterrence is aimed at preventing 
the population at large from committing criminal acts (Zimring, 1973). 
Imposing sanctions on one individual may demonstrate the expected 
penalties of a criminal act to the rest of the public, and thereby 
discourage similar behavior in the population (Nagin, 1978). General 
deterrence is based on the underlying hypothesis that increasing 
either the severity of penalties or the certainty of their imposition 
1 
will reduce crime by1those who are not directly sanctioned (Blumstein 
et al., 1978). Special deterrence, which has received less attention 
from researchers, is concerned with the effects of legal sanctions, 
i.e., punishment, on the specific criminals who receive them (Henshel 
& Silverman, 1975). It is usually studied by examining the recidivism 
rates of identified, punished individuals. 
The deterrence hypothesis is in accordance with economists' 
conceptualization of criminal behavior. Crime is regarded as a ra-
tional act resulting when individuals evaluate the expected utility 
of both criminal and noncriminal opportunities, and then choose the 
alternative with the highest utility (e.g., Becker, 1968). If the 
crime has a higher utility than not committing the crime, e.g., low 
risk of being caught and a large amount to gain, then the individual 
should decide in favor of committing the crime. 
Research on the deterrence issue has developed only in the 
last two decades. In the past, professionals in the criminal justice 
system and most laymen took for granted that fear of sanctions was a 
prime motivator and inhibitor of crime. Academicians, however, were 
skeptical of this approach, tending instead to see behavior as a 
product of a large number of variables including socioeconomic status, 
personality, race and environmental influences (Tittle, 1980). Early 
deterrence research focused on the impact of certainty and severity 
of punishment on official crime rates. Certainty was defined as the 
number of offenders convicted as a proportion of offenses known to 
2 
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the police, and severity of punishment was measured by median time 
served (Teevan, 1975). Most research has found a negative relation-
ship between indexes of sanction probability and actual or probable 
incidence of deviance (Blumstein et al., 1978; Tittle, 1980). 
However, the bulk of the research favoring the deterrence hypo-
thesis is based on aggregate statistics. This approach results in 
severe methodological weaknesses (Carroll, 1982; Blumstein et al., 
1978). An extensive review of deterrence and incapacitation effects 
conducted by the National Academy of Sciences (Blumstein et al., 
1978) illustrates three sources of bias in research supporting the 
deterrence hypothesis: (a) Apparent deterrent effects can be induced 
as a result of errors made in measuring crimes. Citizens' reports, 
and police detection and subsequent reporting of crimes comprise the 
data on known offenses. The risk of being sanctioned for a crime is 
usually measured as the ratio of the number of times the sanction is 
imposed for an offense to the number of known offenses. The crime 
rate is defined as the number of known offenses per population. The 
number of known offenses appears in both ratios. Any variability in 
the reporting of the number of known offenses will, therefore, result 
in a spurious negative association between crime rate and sanction 
risk (Blumstein et al., 1978). (b) A second possible source of bias 
is the confounding of deterrence and incapacitation. Incapacitating 
offenders by putting them in prison will reduce crime even in the 
absence of any deterrent effect (Blumstein et al., 1978). (c) Finally, 
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any relationship between crimes and sanctions could be interpreted in 
the opposite causal direction (Nagin, 1978). Crime rates could cause 
variations in sanctioning. For example, an increase in crime rates 
could produce harsher penalties and more police to fight crime, or 
increased crowding in prisons due to higher crime rates could lead 
to sentence reductions for subsequent offenders (Carroll, 1982). 
Further criticisms of the use of aggregate data have been put 
forth by Waldo and Chiricos (1972). They suggest that the examination 
of aggregate data precludes an examination of situational influences 
that might affect a person's response to threats of punishment. Some 
people may be deterred in situations in which others are not deterred, 
or the same individual may or may not be deterred in different situa-
tions. These authors also claim that by using aggregate statistics, 
researchers are unable to discern those social-psychological processes 
-by which the presumed effects of punishment are realized. 
Crime Perceptions 
The underlying assumption of deterrence research has been that 
potential criminals are aware of both the certainty and severity of 
objective sanctions and operate with this knowledge in mind. Studies 
that regard the potential criminal as a rational being have neglected 
to examine the individual's perceptions of certainty and severity of 
punishment, i.e., measures of subjective judgments (Teevan, 1975). 
A series of studies dealing with individuals' perceptions of punishment 
variables questions the underlying assumption (Assembly Committee on 
Criminal Procedure, 1975; Claster, 1967; Jensen, 1975; Teevan, 1975; 
Waldo & Chiricos, 1972). A sample of male registered voters, inmates 
at a vocational institute, and college students were surveyed to 
assess their knowledge about penalties for 11 selected felonies. Be-
tween 21% and 49% of respondents did not know or could not guess the 
maximum penalties for these crimes. The criminal subgroup had the 
greatest knowledge of penalties. Those who knew the least about crim-
inal penalties were least likely to engage in crime. The committee 
concluded, "It appears that knowledge of penalties can not act as de-
terrents since these are unknown until after a person has committed a 
crime or become a prisoner" (p. 78). 
Further research also proposes that the perception of legal 
sanctions, not knowledge of the actual sanctions, is the primary in-
fluence on a criminal's decision of whether or not to commit a crime 
(Carroll, 1982; Claster, 1967; Henshel & Carey, 1975; Teevan, 1975; 
Waldo & Chiricos, 1975). Claster (1967) compared delinquents and non-
delinquents on their perceptions of arrest and conviction rates for 
various crimes, as well as perceptions of risk to themselves of arrest 
and conviction if they committed three hypothetical crimes. Although 
delinquents and nondelinquents did not differ in their answers for 
arrest and conviction rates, nondelinquents perceived themselves as 
more likely to be arrested and convicted if they committed the hypo-
thetical crimes than did delinquents. A similar trend was found using 
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college students (waldo & Chiricos, 1972). Admitted theft and mari-
juana use and belief in the likelihood of arrest were inversely related. 
No relationship, however, existed between perceptions of severe punish-
ment and admitted criminality. Finally, Teevan (1975) found a weak 
negative relationship between perception of certainty of punishment 
and self-reported deviance. In summary, it appears that noncriminals 
are more influenced by their perceptions of sanctions than criminals. 
Perceptions of sanctions and risks are properties of the indi-
vidual, not necessarily an objective property of the situation. As 
was seen above, criminals tend to perceive themselves as more immune 
from arrest than do noncriminals (Claster, 1967; Kraut, 1976; Waldo 
& Chiricos, 1972). A self-report survey of deterrent influences on 
shoplifting indicated that respondents who shoplifted the most saw 
the least risk associated with shoplifting both in terms of the prob-
ability of getting caught and the severity of punishment (Kraut, 1976). 
As expressed by Henshel and Carey (1975; p. 57), " ••• deterrence, 
when and if it exists, is a state of mind." The general conclusion 
drawn from studies of the perceptions of sanctions and risks is that 
perceptions of risk act as a deterrent to illegal behaviors (Anderson, 
1979; Pasternoster et al_., 1982). The relationship between crime 
rates and perceived severity of legal punishment, however, remains 
unclear (Nagin, 1978; Pasternoster et al., 1982). 
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Evaluating Crime Opportunities 
An alternative to the rational view of criminal behavior proposed 
by economists has been suggested by Carroll (1978, 1982; Carroll & 
Herz; note 1). He suggests that the individual can be regarded as a 
thoughtful decision-maker who chooses among alternative courses of 
action, both criminal and noncriminal. The individual is regarded as 
neither rational or irrational, but rather as "reasoning." This model 
is consistent with the research supporting the limited rationality of 
people (Ebbesen et al., 1977; Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1957). If 
this approach is correct, attempts to deter crime will work only if 
they affect the perceptions and judgments of the potential criminal. 
Studies of risky decision making have shown that people do not 
make a logical, complete evaluation of benefits and risks as economic 
utility models suggest. Instead, they tend to simplify the decision 
situation (Ebbesen et al., 1977; Newell & Simon, 1972; Payne et al., 
1978). People make rapid, selective, strategic assessments based on 
a reasonable, simplified view of their situation (Carroll, 1982). 
Since the time and effort available for processing information is 
limited, people focus on one or more available cues. 
A complex situation such as a crime situation would be dealt 
with through simplified strategies or heuristics involving comparisons 
and judgments (cf. Kahneman et al., 1982; Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971; 
Payne, 1975). A decision maker would be expected to consider simple 
characteristics of a situation at any one point in time. However, 
an extension of decision behavior over time might reveal a number of 
sub-decisions that interact to control the actual outcome (Carroll, 
1982). An example of this type of behavior might be the decision to 
burglarize a particular home. First, the burglar must decide on the 
area of town (e.g., the north end which is very upper class, or the 
west side which is middle class). Next, the burglar determines 
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which home to burglarize by scouting the area to find the most accessi-
ble home. After selecting the house, the criminal decides on a method 
of entry, e.g., forced entry through a basement window. The decision 
to burglarize 1146 Riverside Drive on the west side using forced entry 
is, thus, made up of a set of sub-decisions. 
A series of studies that attempted to manipulate the perceived 
rewards and costs associated with an immediate crime situation sup-
port the idea of a simplified evaluation of the crime situation. 
Hypothetical crime situations were provided to subjects by Rettig 
and Rawson (1963). Certainty of gain, amount of gain, certainty of 
punishment, and severity of punishment were varied from high to low 
levels, and subjects were asked to evaluate each situation in terms 
of their willingness to perform the crime. The strongest effect on 
decisions was the amount of punishment, although the others also had 
significant effects. A similar study by Stefanowicz and Hannum (1971) 
found an effect only for amount of gain~ Other studies also find 
main effects for components rather than interactions (Rettig, 1964; 
Krauss et al., 1972; Feldman, 1977), but all these studies suffer from 
the use of ambiguous or limited manipulations. For example, Feldman 
(1977) manipulated the probability of being caught as 'high' or 'low' 
and the probability that money would be present as 'definitely' or 
'possibly.' These manipulations are ambiguous, increasing the likeli-
hood of individual differences in interpretation. The results of such 
studies are questionable. Clearly, there is a need for more realistic 
and objectively defined variables in future studies. 
Carroll (1978) attempted to overcome some of these limitations 
by providing specific monetary values, penalties, and likelihoods. 
He presented both offenders and nonoffenders with a series of situa-
tions in which they were asked to evaluate the opportunity for com-
mitting a crime. Subjects were provided with information on the 
probabilities of success and failure and potential amounts of gain 
and loss. For example, the probability of gain was either 10%, 30%, 
or 80%, and probability of loss, i.e., punishment, was either 5%, 15%, 
or 40%. It was found that instead of computing utility by multiply-
ing probabilities and penalties to determine expected risks, subjects 
simplified the situation by focusing primarily on one dimension. 
Which dimension was salient varied among the subjects. 
Salient information apparently results in the simplification of 
the crime evaluation. A series of studies reviewed by Taylor and 
Fiske (1973) support the contention that salient features of a situa-
tion will dominate subsequent judgments (see also Nisbett & Ross, 
9 
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1980). The research reviewed on the evaluation of crime opportunities 
emphasizes this simplification process, and lends support to Carroll's 
(1978) model of the reasoning individual. 
Expertise 
An additional focus of ~he present research was to examine the 
effect of expertise on the ·evaluation of crime opportunities. We can 
conceptualize criminals with extensive crime histories as "expert." 
As was seen in the review of crime perceptions, laymen are truly ig-
norant of most aspects of the criminal justice system (Henshel & 
Silverman, 1975). The expert is also ignorant of certain aspects, 
but his/her ignorance is much more selective. A particular set of 
binders are set up and maintained in the expert's mind that shut off 
certain aspects of reality, reinforced by his/her competence and 
arrogance about his/her expertise (Lewinsohn, 1958). Even so, there 
are certain skills, knowledge and strategies possessed by expert 
criminals that distinguish them from novices. 
In the area of decision making, expertise has been defined 
along several dimensions: predictive accuracy, memory, speed of re-
call, and organization of information (Johnson; Note 2). The superior 
performance of experts is dependent upon both the domain of expertise 
being examined and the dimension of expertise measured. The litera-
ture on the predictive or diagnostic accuracy of clinical psychologists 
suggests that there are few differences between experts and novices 
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(Goldberg, 1959; Sarbin, Taft & Bailey, 1960). Experts in medicine 
fare better when compared to novices (Gustafson, 1963; Johnson et al., 
1982; Kundel & LaFollette, 1972), but are surprisingly unreliable in 
their own judgments (Einhorn, 1972; Gillis & Moran, 1981; Hoffman et 
al., 1968). 
Although accuracy does not clearly distinguish experts from 
novices, researchers in the problem-solving area have found differences 
between experts and novices in processing speed, memory, and informa-
tion organization (Adelson, 1981; Chase & Simon, 1973; Simon & Simon, 
1978). In complex situations such as solving physics problems or 
planning chess strategies, experts solved the problems faster and more 
accurately than did novices (Chase & Simon, 1973; Larkin et al., 1980; 
Simon & Simon, 1978). Experts also have better memory for task-
relev~nt information. Expert chess players exhibited superior recall 
of chess positions, retained more information in memory, and were 
quicker to retrieve information from memory than less experienced 
players (Chase & Simon, 1973). Johnson's (1980) study of admission 
decisions indicated that expert judges relied not only on externally 
available information, but also on information stored in memory. 
Experts made judgments in one-half the time of novices, and their in-
formation was more direct and specific. Finally, there is recent 
evidence that experts may organize information in a more abstract 
manner allowing for solutions that are more strategic solutions 
(Adelson, 1981; Larkin et al., 1980). 
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Experts have more knowledge than novices and can quickly recall 
the particular pieces of information that are relevant to the situa-
tion at hand. The expert decision-maker has a larger set of perceptual 
patterns that serve to index not only the expert's factual knowledge, 
but also his/her information about strategies and actions (Larkin et 
al., 1980). 
In every domain that has been explored, considerable know-
ledge has been found to be an essential prerequisite to 
expert skill ••• This knowledge includes sets of rich sche-
mata that can guide a problem's interpretation and solution 
and add crucial pieces of information (p. 1342). 
We would expect expert criminals also to be systematic and quicker in 
their considerations of crime opportunities than novices. Over time, 
criminals accumulate knowledge that should serve to improve their eval-
uations of subsequent crime opportunities. 
Verbal Protocols 
In order to examine the 'reasoning' approach to expert criminal 
decision making (Carroll, 1978) and to circumvent the problems of 
aggregate data, it is advantageous to address the deterrence issue at 
the individual level. Approaches at the individual level have pri-
marily utilized surveys, interviews and first person accounts. The 
validity of these self-reports should be cautiously evaluated because 
of their vulnerability to memory reconstruction and social desirability 
effects (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Kraut (1976) used a self-report 
survey of shoplifting, but admitted that subjects " • may defensive-
ly distort their beliefs about themselves and the environment in order 
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to justify their behavior to themselves or to others, including the re-
searcher" (p. 366). 
To observe criminals as validly as possible, we should observe 
them during considerations of actual crime opportunities (cf., Ericcson 
& Simon, 1980). By focusing on the immediate events proximal to a 
crime, a better understanding of what affects the potential offender 
during his/her crime evaluation would become available. Several 
methods for studying decision making and problem solving in ongoing 
situations have been developed by psychologists. In naturalistic set-
tings, the most appropriate method is the collection of verbal proto-
cols (Ericcson & Simon, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1972; Payne et al., 1978). 
Subjects provide continuous verbal reports by "thinking aloud" about 
their perceptions, thoughts and feelings while performing the behavior 
of interest. Verbal protocols have been used in both laboratory set-
tings (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972; Payne, 1976; Svenson; note 3), and 
in such real world settings as stock portfolio selection (Clarkson, 
1962), airline accident investigations (Braunstein & Coleman, 1967), 
parole decision making (Carroll & Payne, 1977), consumer behavior 
(Payne & Ragsdale, 1977), and medical diagnosis (Johnson et al., 1982). 
Shoplifting 
I have chosen to study criminal thought processes by selecting 
a crime that is accessible for study - shoplifting. Shoplifting is 
frequent, nonviolent, public and observable. It is also a serious 
concern. It has been estimated that between 2% and 8% of customers 
engage in shoplifting (Astor, 1970; Barmash, 1971; Rosenbaum et al., 
1980; Shave, 1978). Faria (1977) estimates that retail store theft 
accounts for 25% of all dollar crime loss in the United States, and 
shoplifting accounts for one-half of that amount (Shave, 1978). 
Despite the widespread prevalence of shoplifting, knowledge 
about the extent and nature of the problem and the effectiveness of 
anti-theft strategies is based on inventory counts, apprehended shop-
lifters and anecdotal reports. Bickman et al. (1979) conducted a 
recent nationwide assessment of retail theft problems and selected 
anti-theft strategies used by retailers. These strategies included 
closed-circuit television, electronic article surveillence, employee 
training and environmental design. One of their major conclusions 
was that "There is little or no scientifically acceptable evidence to 
document the effectiveness of current stra~egies" {p. 301). 
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Little systematic data exists regarding the specific cues po-
tential shoplifters use when making judgments about crime opportunities 
in a store environment. Although Kraut {1976) found that respondents 
who shoplifted the most saw the least risk associated with shoplifting, 
there is no indication of what would represent risk in a store setting. 
The methods that have been used to study shoplifting, e.g., interviews, 
have provided inadequate and/or biased information. The present study 
attempted to reduce these biases by using the verbal protocol method-
ology in real-life shopping situations. Expert shoplifters and non-
shoplifters were asked to walk through stores and to verbalize their 
thoughts, feelings and perceptions. 
A major goal of this research is to investigate shoplifter 
thought processes and in this way clarify issues in deterrence theory 
and expert decision making. It is hoped that examination of thought 
processes will reveal what the shoplifter notices about the item, 
people and security devices, and how these characteristics are eval-
uated and weighed. 
15 
I hypothesize that expert shoplifters will make rapid and 
strategic assessments of shoplifting opportunities based on a few 
salient dimensions. Although novices may also simplify shoplifting 
situations as would be predicted by the "reasoning" model of man 
(Carroll, 1982), they are expected to make slower and less strategic 
evaluations. Furthermore, novices should be more deterred by the risk 
of being caught than experts. The rich source of data provided in 
this study should aid in our understanding of criminal behavior, our 
capacity to control crime, and our understanding of expertise in na-
tural settings. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Most (nearly all) subjects were recruited from the Chicago area 
through newspaper advertisements. An additional few were recruited 
from introductory psychology courses at a Chicago university by handing 
out questionnaires. The advertisements asked for paid volunteers, 
both nonshoplifters and shoplifters, to participate in a study of 
shoplifting. Anonymous self-reports of shoplifting activity were soli-
cited from persons replying to the ads or questionnaires. Respondents 
were offered $8.00 plus travel reimbursement to participate in the 
1 
study. A subject was considered an expert shoplifter if he/she either 
shoplifted: a) 20 times or more ever, or b) 5 times in the past year, 
or c) 10 times ever and at least once in the past year. If the sub-
ject did not meet any of these qualifications he/she was considered a 
nonshoplifter. All available experts.were asked to participate, and 
a sample of nonshoplifters were contacted. Some subjects declined or 
failed to show up for the experiment. 
From the pool of volunteers, 17 shoplifters and 17 nonshoplifters 
actually participated. The expert shoplifters claim to have shoplifted 
1 Support for this project was provided through a grant from the 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago and through a 
Graduate Assistantship from Loyola University of Chicago. 
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a median of 100 times in their lives and at least 10 times in the past 
year. The median nonshoplifter had not shoplifted at all. There 
were 20 males and 14 females in the sample. Subjects did not differ in 
gender across shoplifting expertise, F(l,30)<1.0; or condition, F(l,30) 
<1.0. The mean age of subjects was 27.2 years with an age range from 
18 to 62 years. Age differed neither across expertise, F(l,30)<1.0; 
nor condition, F(l,30)<1.0. 
Design 
The study was designed as a 2 x 2 factorial experiment; the two 
factors were shoplifting expertise--nonshoplifter and expert shoplifter, 
and shopping condition--shopping and shoplift intention. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to either the shopping or the shoplift inten-
tion condition. Those in the shopping condition were simply asked to 
go on a shopping trip. Subjects in the shoplifting intention condition 
were additionally asked to form an int~ntion to shoplift sometime dur-
ing their shopping trip. This manipulation was incorporated to simu-
late situations in which shoplifting would be intended rather than 
precipitated by being in the store. 
Procedure 
Subjects were met by an experimenter of the same gender, usually 
at the experimenter's university office. Six graduate students 
(three male, three female) served as experimenters. Subjects were 
first given practice in the verbal protocol procedures using a booklet 
of store advertisements. They were asked to "think aloud" regarding 
what they saw, read, thought about, and thoUght of doing as they 
looked at the ads. Instructions were also given on how to use the 
tape recorders, which were microcassette SONY recorders with lapel 
microphones. 
Following this practice session, subjects were asked to take 
the experimenter on.a shopping trip, preferably a store or stores in 
which they normally shopped. Upon arriving at the store, subjects 
were reminded of the "think aloud" procedure. In addition, 10 expert 
shoplifters and 8 novices were asked to form an intention to shop-
lift, but were cautioned not to actually remove anything without pay-
ing for it. The tape recorder was concealed in the subject's pocket 
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or purse, with the microphone attached to the subject's clothing. 
Subjects walked through the stores for approximately one hour. Neutral 
prompts were given to subjects when pauses between verbalizations were 
too long (e.g., "Say what you are thinking now."; see Appendix A for 
a complete list of prompts.) 
As subjects walked through stores, the experimenter coded each 
department visited on a number of characteristics. These characteris-
tics included security devices (e.g., mirrors, cameras), store layout 
(e.g., height of aisles), item characteristics (e.g., locked cases, 
chained items), and people· (e.g., number of salesclerks). At the 
completion of the experiment the subject was debriefed, paid for his/ 
19 
her participation, and reimbursed for any travel expenses incurred. 
RESULTS 
Coding Protocols 
Prior to any analyses, subjects' protocols were first broken 
down into short phrases. A phrase corresponds to a naive assessment 
of what constitutes a single reference or task assertion by the sub-
ject (Newell & Simon, 1972). More specifically, in this study a 
phrase consisted of a single idea or thought. Reliabilities were cal-
culated by dividing ~h~ tntal number of phrases coded by each coder 
pair. The intercoder reliabilities for pairs among the 5 coders 
were between 81% and .91%. 
A coding scheme was developed to categorize these phrases. 
Statements were coded into five major categories: perceptual, moti-
vational, judgmental, feeling/emotion, and extraneous. Perceptual, 
motivational, and judgmental categories were further broken down into 
subcategories. Perceptual statements included comments about store 
personnel, people, security devices, item characteristics (e.g., 
size), and layout of the store. For example, the phrase "They have 
a couple of mirrors in the back ••• " was coded as a perceptual state-
ment about security devices. Motivational statements indicated the 
subject's examination of, need for, or attraction to the item, ~.g., 
"I like that shirt." Assessment of risk, shoplifting methods, the 
feasibility of taking an item, i.e., the ease with which an item 
20 
could be shoplifted, and decisions to take or not take an item were 
considered judgmental statements. An example of a risk assessment 
was, "Sometimes I wonder about the consequences of what would happen 
to me if I got caught" (see Table 1 for a complete list of categories 
and subcategories as well as frequencies). Feeling statements were 
not examined further since there were only 8 such statements in the 
entire study. An example of a feeling statement was "I'm getting 
nervous now." Extraneous phrases were those statements that did not 
fit any of the other categories and/or were not related to shopping 
or shoplifting. Reliabilities for the coding of all specific cate-
gories were over 80%. 
Coders also indicated whether each statement was made with 
specific reference to the item, or to the department or store they 
were visiting. An example of a phrase coded at the store level was, 
"Kroch and Brentanos' books are always easy." Finally, coders em-
phasized shoplifting and buying thought sequences by bracketing the 
relevant statements. Discrepancies in protocol breakdown and coding 
were resolved by the author. 
The protocols were adjusted by deleting extraneous statements. 
Protocols ranged in length from 64 to 945 statements (i.e., phrases). 
As a result of the wide variation in length of protocols, much of the 
data violated homogeneity of variance assumptions (Bartlett's test, 
Winer, 1971; p. 208). Therefore, median tests were used instead of 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Shoplifting Statements Made For Each Statement 
Type B~ Condition (item level only) 
. Condition 
Shoplifter/ Shoplifter/ Nonshoplifter/ 
ShOJ:!lift ShoE ShoJ:!lifter 
Percel!tual 
Store personnel 11 ( 2.0%) 6 ( 2.0%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
People 3 ( 0.5%) 4 ( 1.0%) 4 ( 3.0%) 
Security guards 5 ( 0.8%) 0 ( 0.0%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Security devices 8 ( 1.0%) 19 ( 6.0%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Store layout 0 ( 0.0%) 6 ( 2.0%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Size of item 15 ( 2.5%) 13 ( 4.0%) 3 ( 2.0t) 
Price of item 8 ( 1.0%) 15 ( 5.0%) 3 ( 2.0%) 
Naming item 72 (12.0%) 44 (14.0%) 4 ( 3.0%} 
Orientation/location 13 ( 2.0%) 8 ( 2.0%) 1 ( o. 7%) 
Motivational 
Attraction 60 (10.0%) 28 ( 9.0%) 20 (14.0%) 
Use/need 40 ( 7.0;) 12 ( 4.0%). 8 ( 6.0%) 
Examination of item 45 ( 7.0%) 19 ( 6.0%) 14 (10.0%) 
Price too high 1 ( 0.2%) 4 ( 1.0%) 3 ( 2.0%) 
Store service/policy 1 ( 0.2%) 1 ( 0.3%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Intention to shoplift 9 ( 1.5%) 3 ( 0.9%) 2 ( 1.0%) 
Searching for item 2 ( 0.3%) 2 ( 0.6%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Shopping method o· ( 0.0%) 3 ( 0.9%) 1 ( 0.7%) 
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TABLE 1 (cont'd) 
Number of Shoplifting Statements Made For Each Statement 
Type By Condition (item level only) 
Condition 
Shoplifter/ Shoplifter/ Nonshoplifter/ 
ShOJ:!lift ·sho2 ShoJ:!lifter 
Juda!!!ental 
Feasibility 64 (11.0%) 55 (17.0%) 9 ( 6.5%) 
(takeable) 
Tactic/method 107 (18.0%) 51 (16.0%) 23 (17.0%) 
Risks 57 ( 9.0%) 9 ( 3.0%) 20 (14.5%) 
Justifications 7 ( 0.8%) 0 ( 0.0%) 6 ( 4.0%) 
Take/not take 77 (13.0%) 19 ( 6.0%) 17 (12.0%) 
Buy/not buy 0 ( 0.0%) 1 ( 0.3%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
TOTAL 603 322 138 
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more sophisticated methods in many of the analyses. There were no dif-
2 ferences in length of protocol across expertise or condition, X (3)< 
1.0, indicating that the amount of verbalization was not biased by 
the manipulations of this study. 
The major purposes of this study can be organized into three 
areas: (a) an examination of the evaluation of shoplifting opportuni-
ties, including potential deterrents; (b) an examination of criminals' 
thought processes; and (c) a prediction of shoplifting from character-
istics of stores and demographic information about subjects. The 
major hypothesis of this study was that expert shoplifters would eval-
uate crime situations in a rapid, strategic manner focusing on a few 
salient dimensions, and would be less deterred by the risks associated 
with being caught than novices asked to consider shoplifting. 
Evaluating Shoplifting Opportunities 
Initial comparisons of expert and novice shoplifting considers-
tions yielded predictable results. Expert shoplifters devoted a 
median of 10.8% of their protocols to shoplifting, significantly more 
2 than the median of 1.1% by nonshoplifters (X (3) = 11.12, ~< .05). 
They also considered a larger number of items to shoplift than did 
2 
nonshoplifters, X (3) = 9.89, ~< .05. Shoplifters considered a median 
of 7 items and nonshoplifters considered a median of 2 items. A com-
parison of buying statements, however, produced opposite results. 
Nonshoplifters devoted a median of 4.9% of their protocols to buying, 
signficantly more than the median of 2.2% by expert shoplifters 
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2 (X (3) = 7.03, ~ < .05). These groups, however, did not differ in the 
2 
number of items they planned to buy, X (3) = 4.54, ns (Mdn • 1.5; see 
Table 2). 
When the average number of statements made for each shoplifting 
consideration was examined (nonshoplifters in the shop condition were 
not included in this analysis since they did not consider any items 
for shoplifting), nonshoplifters in the shoplift condition had a 
median of 11.25 statements, twice as many for each shoplifting consid-
2 
eration as the median of 5.66 statements made by the experts, X (2) = 
7.96, ~ < .05. A similar but smaller effect was found for the average 
2 
number of statements when considering an item to buy, X (1) : 5.82, 
£ < .05. Nonshoplifters had a median of 5.33 statements related to 
buying an item, whereas shoplifters only had a median of 4.0 statements 
for each buying consideration. Expert shoplifters made more rapid, 
i.e., shorter, evaluations of shoplifting and buying considerations 
than did nonshoplifters. 
Shoplifting evaluations were made at three levels--item, de-
2 partment and store. Experts verbalized significantly more shoplift-
2 ing-related thoughts at both the item level, X (1) = 7.39, ~ < .05; 
2 
and at the departme~t level, X (1) = 7.19, ~ < .05, than did nonshop-
2Analyses were computed on the basis of shoplifting statements, rather 
than using subject comparisons. 
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TABLE 2 
Shoplifting and Buying Statements by Condition 
Subjects' Shoplifting Expertise 
Expert NonshoElifter 
Instructional Set: Shoplift ShoE Shoplift Shop 
No. of Subjects 10 7 8 9 
Mdn. Protocol length 241.5 304.0 293.0 321.0 
(stateme:.rd:s) 
Mdn. % of protocol 41.5% 40.8% 4.9% 0% 
devoted to shop-
lifting* 
Mdn. II of items 7.0 7.0 2.0 0 
considered to 
shoplift* 
Mdn. # of statements 6.09 5.35 11.25 
made per item con-
sidered to shoplift* 
Mdn. % of protocol 2.25% 2.0% 4.45% 13.3% 
devoted to buying 
Mdn. II of items 0.5 1.0 1.5 4.0 
considered to buy 
Mdn. # of statements 4.0 4.0 5.33 5.73 
made per item 
considered to buy* 
* E. < .05 
27 
lifters. 3 Experts devoted a median of 38% of their item-level thoughts 
and 29.5% of their department-level thoughts to .shoplifting, whereas 
novices devoted a median of 5.5% of their item level thoughts to shop-
~ifting and 0% of their department level thought phrases to shoplift-
ing. 
Perceptual statements. The salient features of shoplifting 
opportunities can be assessed by examining the perceptual statements 
made during shoplifting considerations. Because of the small fre-
quencies of some of the subcategories of perceptual statements, these 
categories were combined to create three new subcategories: people 
(i.e., store personnel, security guards, and shoppers), physical 
security (i.e., store layout, location and security devices), and 
item characteristics (i.e., item name, price and size). At the store 
level experts in the two conditions differed in what perceptual 
2 
characteristics they mentioned, X (2) = 17.94, ~ < .01. Nonshop-
lifters rarely made shoplifting-related statements at the store level, 
so they were not included in this analysis. Experts in the shoplift 
intention condition mentioned physical security 79% of the time and 
people 21% of the time; whereas shoplifters in the shop condition 
were less concerned with physical security (34%) and more interested 
in people (34%). 
3 The groups did not differ in the numb2r of shoplifting related 
statements made at the store level, X (2) < 1.0. 
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Novices and shoplifters differed in what they considered salient 
2 
at the item level, X (4) = 10.21, £ < .05; see Table 3. Post hoc 
x2 analyses revealed that the differences were a result of condition, 
x2(2) = 7.91, ~ < .05. Experts in the shop condition mentioned physi-
cal security more often (27.1%) and people less often (8.5%) than 
novices and shoplifters in the shoplift intention conditions (physical 
security- 14.7%; people- 14.4%). Physical security, e.g., security 
devices, is a salient dimension for experts when assessing both the 
store and the item for shoplifting. When specifically asked to consi-
der shoplifting, however, people became a salient feature for both 
experts and novices in their shoplifting evaluations. 
Motivational statements. Motivational statements were examined 
to determine whether experts and novices were differentially motivated 
to shoplift. There were no significant differences, x2(4) = 1.47, ns; 
subjects were motivated by attraction to and/or need for the item. 
Judgment statements. Finally, judgment statements were reviewed 
to determine what kinds of conclusions subjects drew based on their 
perceptions. Experts differed in the judgments they made about the 
2 
store, X (3) = 9.82, ~ < .05. Shoplifters in the shoplift intention 
condition mentioned risks in approximately one-half of their state-
ments (49%) and considered methods of shoplifting in 30% of their 
statements. The shopping condition experts devoted 40% of their judg-
ment statements to feasibility assessments and 28% to potential risks. 
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TABLE 3 
Perceptual Statements Made at the Item Level 
for a Shoplifting Consideration 
Expertise/Condition 
Type of Perceptual Expert/ Expert/ Nonshoplifter/ 
Statements Shoplift Shop Shoplift 
People (i.e., clerks, 19 (14.1%) 10 ( 8.5%) 4 (26.7%) 
shoppers, security) 
Physical security 21 (15.6%) 32 (27.1%) 1 ( 6.7%) 
(e.g., layout, 
mirrors, cameras) 
Item Characteristics 95 (70.4%) 76 (64.4%) 10 (66.7%) 
(e.g., size, price) 
2 X = 10.21, df=4, E< .05 
When specific items were considered, judgmental statements ex-
2 hibited the strongest differences among groups, X (8) • 62.9, ~< .01; 
see Table 4. 2 Post hoc X analyses indicated that both level of ex-
pertise and experimental condition resulted in differences among the 
groups (expert/shoplift vs. expert/shop, x2(4) • 36.82, ~ < .01; ex-
. 2 
pert/shop vs. nonshoplifter/shoplift, X • 44.39, E < .01). Experts 
in the shop condition devoted a median of 46.4% of their judgment 
statements to the feasibility of taking various items; over twice as 
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many as the median of 20.6% for feasibility statements made by subjects 
in the shoplift intention conditions. Method of shoplifting was men-
tioned in approximately 32% of judgment statements across conditions. 
Nonshoplifters mentioned risks more often than either expert group 
(26.7% vs. 5.6% for expert/shop and 18.4% for expert/shoplift). They 
also provided justifications in 8% of their statements, whereas experts 
in the shoplift condition justified their criminal thoughts 1.5% of 
the time, and experts in the shop condition made no justifications at 
the item level. Finally, experts in the shop condition made fewer 
decisions to take or not take an item (15.2%) than did either experts 
in the shoplift condition (24.8%) or nonshoplifters (27.6%). 
To summarize the findings on judgment statements, it appears that 
experts assess the risks of shoplifting at the store level prior to 
any item considerations. Experts in the shoplift condition considered 
specific items for shoplifting, whereas experts in the shop condition 
were likely to make judgments about the possibility of shoplifting, 
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TABLE 4 
Judgmental Statements Made at the Item Level 
for a Shoplifting Consideration 
Expertise/Condition 
Type of Judgmental Expert/ Expert/ Nonshoplifter/ 
Statements Shoplift Shop Shoplift 
Feasibility (i.e., 64 (20.6%) 58 (46.4%) 9 (12.0%) 
takeable) 
Tactic/Method 107 (34.5%) 41 (32.8%) 23 (30.6%) 
Risks 57 (18.4%) 7 ( 5.6%) 20 (26.7%) 
Justifications 5 ( 1.6%) 0 ( 0.0%) 6 ( 8.0%) 
Decision (i.e., 77 (24.8%) 19 (15.2%) 17 (22.6%) 
take/not take) 
x2 = 62.92, df=S, £ < .01 
rather than to make actual item considerations. Risks were mentioned 
by experts, but to a lesser extent than by novices. Novices rarely 
made judgments at the store level. When considering an item, non-
shoplifters were concerned with both risks and making justifications 
for shoplifting an item. Justifications for shoplifting were made by 
only a few people. Nonshoplifters mentioned that the item was not 
expensive and would not be missed, while shoplifters said that they 
only stole items that they needed/and or shoplifted when they did not 
have the money to pay for the item. 
Deterrents 
Another way of examining subjects' evaluations of crime oppor-
tunities is by finding out what are considered deterrents to shop-
lifting, and how these deterrents affect evaluations. Subjects often 
mentioned what would and would not deter them from deciding to take 
an item. Both perceptual and judgmental statements could serve as 
deterrent statements. Deterrents included security devices, item 
inaccessibility (e.g., too large), and the possibility of being ob-
served and/or caught, and negative feelings such as guilt. The lack 
of these deterrents plus store layout conducive to shoplifting, e.g., 
high counters, were considered facilitators to shopliftir-g. Experts 
and novices mentioned both deterrents and facilitators. 
Looking at the specific deterrents mentioned, 4 presence (or 
4
cell frequencies were too small to compute statistical tests on 
these findings. 
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absence) of security devices accounted for 32% of all deterrent (or 
facilitator) statements made by expert shoplifters, whereas nonshop-
lifters only mentioned security devices in 10% of their considerations. 
For example, one expert said "Aha, most of the cases have deadbolt 
locks." The novices tended to focus on the possibility of being 
caught (39%), and negative feelings such as guilt (12%). When con-
sidering some earrings, one novice said " ••• it would be, you know, 
against the law. and I guess that's where my mom comes in my head 
saying what right is it of yours to take." Both ·shoplifters and non-
shoplifters did consider the accessibility of the item as a major 
factor in considering whether or not to take an .item. Deterrents and 
facilitators to shoplifting are presented in Table 5. 
Although the cell frequencies are small, especially for novices, 
and should be interpreted with caution, there are differences in what 
are considered deterrents. Experts consider security devices and in-
accessibility of items as primary deterrents to shoplifting. The 
primary deterrents for novices were the possibility of being observed 
and/or caught and their feelings of guilt and fear. The most import-
ant facilitator to shoplifting for novices was not being observed; 
whereas experts considered item accessibility and the lack of security 
devices as favorable conditions for shoplifting. 
Deterrents and decisions to take an item. Despite the differ-
ences in deterrents mentioned, the final decision to take an item 
~vJ\S Tot1! 
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TABLE 5 
Deterrents and Facilitators to Shoplifting 
Sho~lifters Nonsho~lifters 
Security devices 32% (61) 10% ( 3) 
Item accessibility 38% (73) 23% ( 7) 
Store personnel 10% (19) 6% ( 2) 
Being observed and/ 17% (33) 39% (12) 
or caught 
Store layout 3% ( 5) 10% ( 3) 
Negative feelings 5% (11) 12% ( 4) 
2 did not differ between experts and nonshoplifters, X (1) • 1.44, ns. 
Nonshoplifters always mentioned one facilitator and never any de-
terrents when they decided to take an item (N•6). However, when they 
decided not to take an item (N=S), they always mentioned at least one 
deterrent, but also often mentioned facilitators. One deterrent was 
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enough to stop a nonshoplifter from taking an item. The following ex-
cerpt from a nonshoplifter serves to illustate this: 
This would be the kind of place. There's no cameras that 
you can see, doesn't look like there's any 2-way mirrors. 
There's no guards. 'Cause the sale, it's really crowded. 
There's too many people to handle. The only thing that 
would stop me probably is that it just doesn't seem like 
it's worth the risk to put something that only costs a dollar 
in your pocket. On the other hand, if it was really expens-
ive, it wouldn't be worth the risk 'cause you could get in 
real trouble. 
Experts also mentioned a median of one deterrent when they de-
cided not to take an item (N~63). Experts in the shop condition some-
times also mentioned facilitators, but those in the shoplift condition 
did not. When deciding in favor of taking the item (N=72), experts 
in the shoplift condition mentioned a median of one facilitator. Ex-
perts in the shop condition talked about deterrents as well as facili-
tators. Mention of a deterrent was followed by a facilitator. In 
effect, experts discounted the deterrents (e.g., mirrors, a salesclerk) 
by talking about how to get around them. The following excerpts pro-
vide examples of this strategy: 
Belts, leather. It's got denim running through it, yeah. 
Once again I would say if there would be any attempt I 
think something like this would be sufficient, and probably 
relatively simple to do. It's only a saleslady around, and 
she's not paying that much attention anyhow. 
They have new .electronic gadgets. They kill me. They only 
detect it if you carry it high enough to go between them. 
Up to a height of about 2 feet they don't work. 
In summary, nonshoplifters are deterred from taking an item if 
they perceive a single deterrent. This is most likely to be related 
to the fear of being caught or the inability to conceal the item. 
Experts were most often deterred by physical security, but sometimes 
attempted t~ get ~rc~r.d o~ discount these deterrents in their shop-
lifting strategies. 
Thought Processes 
In order to examine the way in which subjects process informa-
36 
tion to arrive at a final decision in shoplifting situations, the order 
of shoplifting statements was determined at the item, department and 
store levels. Examining beginning and ending statements of each se-
quence, it was found that nonshoplifters most often began with per-
ceptual statements. All groups most often ended their shoplifting 
thought sequences with a judgmental statement (see Table 6). Experts 
often mentioned motivational thoughts prior to ending with a judgment 
statement. Transitions in thought were also calculated; a transition 
was defined as a shift from one type of statement (e.g., perceptual) 
to another. Nonshoplifters and experts did not differ; both made 
approximately two transitions per thought sequence, ~(23) < 1.0. 
By examining the specific subcategories of statements made, an 
TABLE 6 
Shoplifting Thought Order at the Item Level 
Average number * 
of transactions 
Expert 
Shoplift 
2.06 
Expertise/Condition 
Expert 
Shop· 
1.93 
Nonshoplifter/ 
Shoplift 
1.90 
Beginning 
statement 
Motivational (53%) Perceptual (56%) Perceptual (54%) 
End 
Statement 
Thought order 
* 
Judgmental 
t < 1.0, df•l, ns 
(71%) Judgmental (67%) Judgmental (54%) 
p -) (M) -)J p -) (M) ~J 
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attempt was made to const~uct the most probable item level thought 
sequence for each group. Nonshoplifters began by indicating how much 
they liked and could use a particular item, then contemplated the pos-
sible risks involved and .the strategies they could use for taking a 
particular item, and finally made a judgment as to whether or not they 
would take the item. Experts in the shopping and shoplifting condi-
tions evidenced a~alogous thought sequences. Both began by na~ing 
the item they were considering; experts in the shop condition wertt on 
to examine the item, often mentioning price. They then determined the 
"takeability" (i.e., the ease with which the item could be shoplifted) 
of the item and planned their method of shoplifting. After naming the 
item, experts in the shoplift condition mentioned that they liked the 
item, determined whether or not the item was feasible to take, and 
finally asses~ed the method of shoplifting and the risks involved 
(see Table 7 ) • 
Although expert and novice groups did not differ in the pro-
portion of shoplifting statements that were begun by naming the item, 
X2(2) = 5.64, ns, there was some indication of a trend in the data. 
Experts in the shoplift condition began by naming a median of 42% of 
their items, experts in the shop condition named a median of 33% of 
the items considered for shoplifting. Nonshoplifters, at the median, 
did not name any items. 
Thought patterns were not examined for nonshoplifters at the 
TABLE 7 
Shoplifting Tho~ght Processes at the Item Level 
Expertise/Condition 
Experts/Shoplift 
Experts/Shopping 
Item-+ 
(P)* 
Item~ 
(P) 
Statement Order 
Like -+ 
(.H) 
Third 
Takeability ----t 
Examine/Price~Takeability ----t 
(H) (P) (J) 
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Fourth 
Tactic and R!W 
(J) 
Tactic 
(J) 
Nonshoplifters/ 
Shoplift 
Like -=t 
(H) 
Use -:.p 
(H) 
Risks and Tactic ...:It Take or 
(J) not take 
(J) 
*(P) • Perceptual statement 
(M) • Motivational statement 
(J) • Judgmental statement 
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department and store le~els since they made too few shoplifting-
related statements at these levels. At the department level, thought 
order was not clear for shoplifters. Experts in the shoplift condi-
tion usually mentioned that they could use items in a particular de-
partment and how easy it would be to take something in that department 
(i.e., feasibility judgment). Shoplifters in.the shop condition were 
much more observant of store layout and people, and were also likely 
to make a judgment about the feasibility of shoplifting in that de-
partment. The order of thoughts at the store level was variable. Ex-
perts in both conditions most often mentioned security devices and how 
feasible it was to shoplift in each store. As was the case when in-
dividual statements were examined, we find that shoplifters assess 
the feasibility of the store and department for shoplifting. For the 
most part, their assessments included scanning security devices and 
people. 
Levels of shoplifting thoughts were inspected to determine wheth-
er any hierarchical processing occurred. Hierarchical processing 
would occur if subjects mentioned characteristics of the store, then 
the department, and lastly, a specific item, in sequence. Nonshop-
lifters exhibited no apparent hierarchy of thoughts. This is in part 
attributable to the prior finding that nonshoplifters made few shoplift-
ing-related statements at the department and store levels. Experts, 
in contrast, did evidence a slightly hierarchy of thoughts. They often 
assessed the feasibility of either the store£! the department first, 
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and then considered items within the store or department for shoplift-
ing. 
Predicting Shoplifting 
The characteristics of each department visited were recorded by 
experimenters during the sub~ects' store trips, and later they were 
given scores as to the feasibility of the department for shoplifting: 
higher scores indicated lower feasibility (see Appendix B for sample 
of departm~nt coding sh~et). 5 Security device and item characteristic 
scores ranged from 0-3, and store layout scores ranged from 0-7. The 
number of salesclerks and shoppers present were estimated. Since 
security personnel were infrequently present, only the presence or ab-
sence of security personnel in each department was recorded. A visi-
bility index was used as a rating scale to indicate what percentage 
of the time the subject was visible to others in the department. 
The index was-broken down into 5 intervals from (1) visible 80-100% 
of the time to (5) visible 20% or less. The median score across de-
partments for these measures was calculated for each store subjects 
patronized. Additional independent variables included in the following 
analyses were: store type, time of day, and age, gender and shoplift-
ing experience of the subject. Using this information a series of 
5unless otherwise indicated, the remaining analyses were calculated 
using the store rather than the subject or item as the unit of analy-
ses. Nonshoplifters in the shopping condition were not included in 
the remaining analyses. 
multiple regression analyses were computed in an attempt to predict 
various shoplifting measures: the number of items considered to 
shoplift, the proportion of thoughts devoted to shoplifting, and the 
final decision to take an item. Store type and time of day were 
dummy coded. Evening served as the criterion group for morning, mid-
day and afternoon times. Department, drug and grocery stores were 
coded using "other" stores (i.e., all stores tha.t did not fit in the 
prior categories) as the criterion group. 
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Number of items considered. The type of store was the only 
significant predictor of the number of items a subject considered for 
shoplifting, accounting for 25% of the variance using multiple regres-
sion, !(2,59) = 9.86, £ < .002. The number of items considered in 
department and drug stores (X = 2.59) was greater than the number con-
sidered in grocery and other stores (X= 0.93). When only expert shop-
lifters were examined, both the type of store and the time of day pre-
dicted the number of items considered, explaining 38% of the variance, 
F(3,34) = 7.09, £ < .001. Shoplifters considered more items in de-
partment and drug stores than in grocery and other stores (X's = 3.24 
and 0.68, respectively). A mean of 4 items were considered in evening 
hours, whereas only a mean of 1.7 items were considered across the 
other time periods. However, since only one expert was run in the 
evening this should be interpreted cautiously. 
Proportion of shoplifting thoughts. The proportion of thoughts 
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I 
devoted to shoplifting was best predicted by the gender of the subject, 
the visibility of sale~clerks, past shoplifting experience, age, and 
time of day. These predi_ctors accounted for 51% of the variance in 
a multiple regression analysis, F(5,56) ~ 11.8_2~ E.< .001; see Table 8. 
Gender alone accounted for 22% of the variance in.the proportion of 
shoplifting-related .thoughts. Males devoted a mean.of 36% of their 
protocols to shoplifting, whereas females only devoted a mean of 
4% of their thoughts to shoplifting. Salesclerk visibility increased 
explained variance beyond that attributed to gender by 13%. The more 
visible salesclerks were, the smaller the proportion of protocol de-
voted to shoplifting. When ~alesclerks were visible 80% to 100% of 
the time, only a mean of 9% of subjects' protocols were devoted to 
shoplifting. This increased, however, as salesclerks visibility de-
creased, t~ the point where a mean of 56% of protocols were shoplifting-
related when visibiliry was 20% or less. Also, as would be expected, 
the more experienced the subject was, the larger the proportion of 
protocol' dPvoted to shoplifting. The nc•vices, those who had never 
shoplifted, devoted a mean of 5% of their protocols to shoplifting, 
whereas the most experienced shoplifters (i.e., those who shoplifted 
500 times or more) devoted a mean of 70% of their thoughts to shop-
lifting. 
Salesclerk visibility and gender were the best predictors of 
~he percent of thoughts devoted to shoplifting .when only shoplifters 
were examined. These variables accounted for· 38% of the variance, 
TABLE 9 
Predictors of the Percent of Protocol Devoted to Shoplifting 
Variable 
Sex 
Sal~sclerk 
visibility 
Past shoplifting 
experience 
Age 
Time of day 
(afternoon) 
Total 
Additional 
Variance 
Explained 
22.5% 
12.1% 
6.4% 
5.9% 
4.5% 
Beta Stepwise F 
-.527 17.38 
.200 15.62 
.344 13.46 
-.411 12.63 
-.249 11.82 
All variables were significant at the£< .001 level or better. 
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!(2,35) = 10.53, ~ < .003. The more visible salesclerks were, the 
less shoplifters thought about shoplifting (X = 17.6% for 80% to 100% 
visible, increasing to X= 73.3% for 20% or less visible). Male 
shoplifters also thought more about shoplifting than did females. 
A closer examination of this gender difference was conducted 
using subject as the unit of analysis. A oneway ANOVA indicated that 
male and female shoplifters did not differ in the number of items 
considered for shoplifting, !(1,15) < 1.0. Shoplifters considered a 
mean of 9.4 items. Gender differences were found for the percent of 
protocol devoted to shoplifting, !(1,15) = 6.67, ~ < .02. Males de-
voted 56.4% of their protocols to shoplifting on the average, whereas 
females only devoted a mean of 13.2% of their verbalizations to shop-
lifting. Although there was a trend for male shoplifters to make more 
statements when considering an item for shoplifting than females, this 
trend was not significant, ~(13) = 2.07, ns; (X= 6.01 items for 
males, and X= 4.14 items for females). Looking at higher levels 
statements, i.e., store and department levels, it was obvious without 
any analyses that females were not making any shoplifting statements 
at the store or department levels. Females accounted for only 7% of 
all statements made at the store and department levels. 
Final decisions. The best determinants of the proportion of 
items subjects decided to take were store type and time of day., 
These variables accounted for 25% of the variance, !(2,59) = 9.90, 
~ < .0002. Subjects decided to take a larger proportion of items in 
department stores than in .all other types of stores (X's m 0.61 and 
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0.28, respectively), and a larger proportion of items in the evening 
hours than during other times of the day (X K 0.98 and 0.34, respect-
6 ively). For shoplifters, the only predictor of the proportion of 
items decided to take was store type. Store type accounted for 31% 
of the variance, !(2,35) = 8.03, ~ < .0013. Shoplifters decided to 
take items more often in both department and drug stores than in 
other stores (X= 0.51 and 0.13, respectively). 
Two-way analyses of variance were computed using store type 
and time of day as independent variables and store characteristics 
as dependent variables to determine whether stores differed on these 
characteristics. The only significant store characteristic was the 
number of store personnel present, !(3,69) = 4.79, ~ < .004. A post 
hoc studentized range statistic indicated that grocery stores had 
more sales personnel (X= 7.7) than other stores (X's = 4.3 for de-
partment store, 3.6 for drug stores, and 2.9 for other stores). 
In summary, the predictors of shoplifting were similar for 
experts and nonshoplifters. Both groups not only considered more 
items for shoplifting in department stores than in other stores, but 
6 The time of day that subjects visited stores did not differ by either 
shoplifting status, F(l,30) < 1.0; nor experimental condition, !(1,30) 
< 1.0. 
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also decided to take a larger proportion of .these items than items 
considered in other stores. Experts also considered and decided to 
take more items in drug stores. More decisions to take an item were 
made during evening hours. Male subjects devoted a larger proportion 
of their protocols to shoplifting than fe~le subjects. The strongest 
influence on subjects' thoughts, second only to gender, was salesclerk 
visibility. As salesclerk visibility increase~, subjects made fewer 
shoplifting verbalizations. 
DISCUSSION 
The major contribution of this research was to provide a more 
detailed understanding of criminal behavior. This was accomplished 
through the analysis of crime evaluations made in shoplifting situa-
tions. Verbal protocols generated by both expert and novice shop-
lifters furnished information about which features of the situation 
are salient, which features serve as deterrents to shoplifting, and 
how individuals make evaluations of crime opportunities. The dis-
cussion will concentrate on two major areas: the evaluation of po-
tential crime opportunities and expert decision making. 
Evaluation of Potential Crime Situations 
The results suggest first that the instructional manipulation 
influenced shoplifting verbalizations. Novices only spoke of shop-
lifting if they were told to do so in the instructions. Experts also 
differed by ~ondition. The experts in the shoplift condition made 
more actual considerations of items, whereas experts in the shop con-
dition made more risk assessments at the store level and made fewer 
decisions to take (or not take) an item. These differences are most 
likely due to the instructions. Experts decided to take (or not take) 
more items when the instructions explicitly said to think about shop-
lifting. Expert subjects in the shop condition, although they con-
sidered as many items as experts in the shoplift condition, were more 
likely to assess the likelihood of shoplifting rather than making any 
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final decisions. The data suggest that experts may typically consider 
shoplifting while shopping, even when they do not have any prior in-
tention to shoplift. However, the potential effect of demand charac-
teristics may have resulted in more shoplifting verbalizations than 
might actually occur. There was no opportunity in this study to assess 
this threat. 
Secondly, the results also suggest that experts and novices do 
not evaluate shoplifting situations in the same way. The only obvious 
similarity between these groups was the motivation for shoplifting. 
Experts and nonshoplifters were motivated by either the need for or 
the attraction to an item. As was predicted by the "reasoning" model 
(Carroll, 1978), both experts and novices based their evaluations on 
simplified versions of situations. What was considered salient for 
shoplifting considerations, however, differed from novices and experts. 
Novices cons1dered people to be a key factor, whereas experts, al-
though aware of people, placed more weight on the evidence of physical 
security. Experts were more concerned with the specific strategies 
needed to shoplift and the physical deterrents to shoplifting, e.g., 
security devices, and less worried about the risks involved when they 
considered items for shoplifting. In contrast the risks of being 
observed and/or captured, as well as justifications for shoplifting, 
were major concerns for nonshoplifters. 
What was considered an effective deterrent also differed with 
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level of expertise. Perceptions of the likelihood of sanction, i.e., 
being observed and captured, were the strongest influences on nonshop-
lifters' thoughts. The perception of a single deterrent was sufficient 
to prohibit shoplifting. Apparently, some type of deterrent effect is 
operating for novices. Experts, on the other hand, were deterred by 
strategy-specific problems such as item size, security devices, and 
the chance of being observed. These deterrents are proximal to the 
crime opp0rtunity. Few expert shoplifters considered the distal con-
sequences of shoplifting - arrest, trial, fines, jail. These findings 
are consistent with the literature on crime perceptions (e.g., Claster, 
1967; Kraut, 1976; Waldo & Chiricos, 1972). Experienced criminals 
give the least weight to the probability of being caught. Shoplifters 
were most concerned with immediate issues of concealing items and 
avoiding detection. In a number of cases, the experts also attempted 
to work arou~d deterrents or simply discounted them in planning their 
strategies. These findings, along with previous research, suggest 
that experts perceive the risks of being detected and caught as under 
their own control because they can rely on their expertise to avoid 
detection. 
Store characteristics were coded to provide a more objective 
measure with which to assess subjects' crime evaluations. Store type 
consistently predicted the number of items considered to shoplift and 
the final decision to take an item for both shoplifters and novices. 
Subjects considered more items in department and drug stores than in 
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other kinds of stores. .This finding coincides nicely with earlier 
research. Morton (1975) found that department stores account for 41% 
of total retail sales in the United States but account for 61% of all 
crimes. Drug stores represent 6% of retail sales but claim 10% of all 
losses due to crime, and grocery stores make up 42% of retail sales 
but only experience 21% of all criminal losses. .Shoplifting occurs 
primarily in department and drug stores. When store types were com-
pared, however, the only significant difference was the number of 
sales personnel present. Grocery stores had more sales personnel 
than any other store type. Although this may be a partial explanation 
for the small number of items considered in grocery stores, it does 
not explain why few items were also considered in "other" stores, e.g., 
bookstores, which had few sales personnel to serve as deterrents. 
One potential explanation for the lack of differences in stores 
is the nonstandardized method used to code stores. Rather than ob-
taining a thorough assessment of each store, coders only noted what 
was visible to them while in the store. Because subjects varied in the 
amount of time they spent in each store, the extensiveness of the cod-
ing for each store also varied. Furthermore, the interceder reliabili-
ties for coding were not determined. Therefore, a definitive explana-
tion of why a larger number of items are considered in department and 
drug stores can not be given. I would speculate, however, that de-
partment and drug stores carry items that are more interesting and/or 
accessible, e.g., easily concealable, to shoplifters. 
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A strong influence on the amount of shoplifting verbalizations 
generated was the degree to which sales personnel was visible. The 
more visible sales personnel were, the less subjects verbalized shop-
lifting thoughts. The larger number of sales people in grocery stores 
resulted in less shoplifting verbalizations, and subsequently, fewer 
items considered for shoplifting. Shoplifters can adjust their 
strategies to overcome static deterrents, i.e., security devices and 
store layout, and in fact, some of the shoplifters in the study at-
tempted to do that. Store personnel, however, are dynamic and can 
change their behavior to interfere with shoplifters' strategies. Other 
studies agree that sales personnel are effective deterrents of shop-
lifting behavior (Bickman et al., 1979). Stores can effectively have 
a strong negative impact on shoplifting because sales personnel are 
potential deterrents that stores can control. However, when stores 
cut their c~sts by lowering salaries or reducing sales staff, an in-
crease in shoplifting would be a natural consequence. 
A further interesting finding was that subjects decided to take 
a larger proportion of items during evening hours than at any other 
time. This finding did not hold when only shoplifters were examined. 
While there is no clear consensus regarding peak shoplifting hours, 
some studies suggest that the largest volume of shoplifting occurs 
during afternoon hours (Griffin, 1978; Shave, 1978). Apparently, sub-
jects, especially novices, perceived the least likelihood of being 
apprehended during evening hours. Increased surve~llence by sales 
staff during evening hours could potentially decrease shoplifting. 
Expert Criminal Decision Making 
The results provide a fairly clear indication that expert shop-
lifters not only verbalize more shoplifting thoughts .than nonshop-
lifters, but also, think differently when evaluating a shoplifting 
opportunity. Experts were much more efficient in their strategies, 
making rapid and orderly evaluations of items for shoplifting. They 
averaged fewer than six statements per item considere~, whereas non-
shoplifters made twice as many statements per consideration. Novices 
had a difficult time making a decision, vacillating between taking 
and not taking the item. The efficiency of these experts is consist-
ent with research indicating that even when experts and novices use 
similar decision rules, the experts are faster (Johnson, 1981). 
The purposive manner of experts' strategies is seen in their 
tendency to assess the department and store for the feasibility of 
shoplifting prior to examining specific items. Shoplifters focused 
attention on the evidence of security devices, the physical layout of 
the store, and the number of people present. A negative evaluation 
of the store was less likely to result in the consideration of 
items in that store for shoplifting. Nonshoplifters rarely ascer-
tained the feasibility of the store for shoplifting. The thought 
order of experts' considerations followed logically from identifying 
the item, examining it.to determine shoplifting potential, and then 
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planning the method of .shoplifting. Nonshoplifters were less logical, 
often becoming preoccupied with the assessment of risks and failing 
to determine the takeability of the object. 
The experts' protocols are consistent with a schematic method 
of information processing. ~lthough not statistic~lly significant, 
the completely unexpected finding that experts tended to name the 
item they were considering for shoplifting more often than novices 
suggests that shoplifters have information about items organized around 
the item-type or item-name. These categories might contain informa-
tion about the "takeability" of the item and the best methods to 
shoplift the item. For example, an item such as sunglasses, a fre-
quently mentioned shoplifting item in this study, might activate a 
schema of a small, easily concealable item that is very feasible for 
shoplifting. This schema could be based on past shoplifting experience 
with similar-items. The organization of information by item-type fits 
the concept of prototypes (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), or a central tendency 
schema (Hastie, 1981). A prototype can be defined as the member of a 
category that has the most characteristics in common with other mem-
bers of the category and the least attributes in common with members 
of contrasting categories. When experts name an item, they may be 
activating a schema or prototype of a "shopliftable" item. Novices 
also named items they were considering, but much less frequently than 
experts. This suggests .that novices may have schemas that are only 
partially developed and lacking in richness (cf., Lurigio & Carroll, 
note 4). 
A further implication of schematic processing is the hierarchi-
cal nature of experts' shqplifting considerations. Shoplifters 
typically assessed the store or department prior to considering a 
particular item. Hastie (1981), Abelson (1981), and others have 
proposed schema hierarchies of information processing. According to 
Hastie (1981), there are three levels of schemas. The highest level 
consists of the procedural schema which directs information search 
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and plans of action. The second level is the template schema that 
provides a filing system for classifying incoming information. Pro-
totypes comprise the lowest level of schema processing. Shoplifters' 
evaluations are suggestive of this pattern. The shoplifter first 
assesses the security set-up of the store (or department) and makes 
a determination of shoplifting feasibility. This is very similar 
to the description of procedural schema. Specific items are than 
considered for shoplifting. For those items that meet the qualifica-
tions for a shopliftable object, i.e., match the prototype, a strategy 
for shoplifting is recalled or devised that is dependent on the ob-
ject and the situation. Apparently, once a prototype is evoked, 
another procedural schema is used to plan the shoplifting act. The 
template schema of classifying information appears to be utilized 
at both the store and items levels. Although shoplifters' evalua-
tions do not strictly conform to Hastie's levels of schematic process-
ing, they suggest that a similar process is occurring. The schematic 
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nature of experts' shoplifting evaluations is only suggestive but 
conforms to findings of schema processing by experts in other domains 
(e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Johnson, 1981; Larkin et al., 1980). 
Validity 
Evaluating the extent to which these results provide valid 
insights about shoplifting is a difficult process. Some indications 
of validity are that the deterrent effect of sales personnel, the 
prevalence of shoplifting thoughts in department and drug stores, and 
the perceptions of risks mentioned are in accord with other accounts 
of shoplifting activity (e.g., review of Bickman et al., 1979; Kraut, 
1976). The expected differences between shoplifters and nonshop-
lifters, and the general impression obtained by the experimenters that 
subjects were serious and motivated augments the perception of validity. 
There are, however, some indications that demand characteristics 
influenced subjects to say what they thought was expected. All sub-
jects knew the study related to shoplifting because the newspaper 
advertisements specifically mentioned shoplifting. Many shoplifters 
seemed motivated to impress the experimenters with their expertise, 
and a few were disappointed when they learned that they would not 
actually steal anything. There was an obvious difference in the 
percentage of protocol devoted to shoplifting by males and females. 
Male shoplifters may have been trying to impress their (male) experi-
menters and/or the fe~ales may have been inhibited from revealing 
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socially unacceptable behavior. It should be noted that gender did 
not affect the number of items considered for shoplifting. Addition-
ally, the effect of sales personnel visibility may have resulted in 
an inhibition of shoplifting verbalizations of shoplifting thoughts. 
At this time, there is no truly convincing argument one way or 
another. 
SUMMARY 
Using a verbal protocol methodology, both expert shoplifters 
and nonshoplifters verbalized their thoughts during evaluations of 
actual shoplifting situations. This procedure was successful at 
providing observations of typically covert thought processes. Re-
sults revealed that expert shoplifters were more strategic, efficient 
and schematic than nonshoplifters. Experts considered more items to 
shoplift and did so in a shorter amount of time (i.e., fewer verbal-
izations per item) than novice shoplifters. Novices were more likely 
to vacillate between taking and not taking an item. Experts also 
named the item they were considering more often than novices sug-
gesting that experts might be activating schemas related to shop-
lifting and shoplifting strategies. 
With regard to deterrence, experts were deterred by sales per-
sonnel and strategic difficulties (e.g., size of the item) whereas 
nonshoplifters were deterred by fear, morality, lack of knowledge 
and lack of skills. The implication of this finding is that expert 
shoplifters might be deterred most successfully through the wise 
use of store personnel who provide a highly visible and mobile de-
terrent. Although the research was demanding in time and effort, it 
provides a useful corollary to studies of aggregate crime and inventory 
statistics and rettospective self-reports of apprehended criminals. 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
Neutral Prompts 
1. Remember, say anything that comes to mind, no matter how 
unimportant it seems to you. 
2. Say what you are doing now. 
3. Remember, talk about whatever you see. 
4. Talk about what observations you are making. 
5. Mention anything that you are thinking about. 
6. Be sure to say what you are doing now. 
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APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX B 
Department Coding Form 
Subject ______ ~---------
Condition ______________ __ 
Interviewer ____________ __ 
Store __________________ __ 
DEVICES 
II signs __________ _ 
CRIME THIEF RUIN REP. 
ARREST PROSECUTE JAIL 
II cameras------
11 two-way mirrors _____ _ 
II convex mirrors 
misc. _________________ __ 
Exits: 
to street: CONTROLLED 
NOT CONTROLLED 
rest of store: CONTROLLED 
NOT CONTROLLED 
Fire exits: CONTROLLED 
NOT CONTROLLED 
Stockroom: CONTROLLED 
NOT CONTROLLED 
Restroom: CONTROLLED 
NOT CONTROLLED 
II 
LAYOUT 
PEOPLE 
II 
visible SJlYin&_ 
Security 
Sal"s 
Shoppers 
Dept.---------------------------
Size of Dept. 633 659 M BB H 
Time---------------------
Date--------------------
ITEM CONTROL 
tags: ALL ITEMS------------
EXPENSIVE ONLY:. _____ _ 
chains: ALL ITEMS-----------
EXPENSIVE ONLY ______ _ 
cases: ALL ITEMS---------
EXPENSIVE ONLY------
misc. _______________________ ___ 
aisle: Heigh ft. 
Length 633 659 M BB H 
transparency: YES NO 
cashiers: CENTER PERIPHERY 
NEAR EXIT RAISED 
dressing room: 
doors: FULL ~ CURTAIN 
locks: YES __ NO 
attendant: YEL_ NQ_ 
RECEIP~ COUNt____ 
vis. II 
index appr. content ( h h d) w at appene 
visibility index: 1. always (80-100%) 4. slightly (20-40%) 
rarely (0-20%) 2. very (60-80%) 5. 
3. moderately (40-60%) 
# • 1, 2, ••• 10, 14, 20, 30 
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